The Federal Reserve System and the federal funds rate: evaluating the Fed\u27s rate-targeting decisions through the use of Taylor-type monetary policy rules by Mireault, Michelle Lynn
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2004
The Federal Reserve System and the federal funds
rate: evaluating the Fed's rate-targeting decisions
through the use of Taylor-type monetary policy
rules
Michelle Lynn Mireault
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mireault, Michelle Lynn, "The Federal Reserve System and the federal funds rate: evaluating the Fed's rate-targeting decisions through
the use of Taylor-type monetary policy rules" (2004). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 17200.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/17200
Th e Federal Reserve Sys tem and the federal funds ra te: 
Evalua ting the Fed 's ra te-tai-geting decisions 
through the use of T aylor-type monetary policy rules 
by 
M ichelle Lyon M ireault 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in parti al fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Economics 
Program of Study Committee: 
Helle Bunzel, Major Professor 
Joydeep Bhattacharya 
Geoffrey Friesen 
Jowa State University 
Ames, lowa 
2004 
II 
Graduate College 
Iowa Stale Univers ity 
This is to certi fy that the master" s thesis of 
Michelle Lynn Mireault 
has met the thesis requirements oflowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES 
LIST OFT ABLES 
ABSTRACT 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL 
Introduction 
Federal Reserve System 
The original Taylor rule 
Critiques of the Taylor rule 
CHAPTER 2. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data collection and definitions 
Model development and testing 
Model selection 
CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
REFERENCES CITED 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
BJOGRAPHTCAL SKETCH 
IV 
v 
VI 
1 
1 
1 
6 
8 
13 
13 
13 
21 
24 
30 
34 
36 
37 
IV 
UST OF FIGURES 
Figure I. Intended federal funds rate change, 1990 to present, taken from 
The Federal Reserve Board: Open market operations, 2004. 
Figure 2. Test for parameter stab ility for model (2) starting 1987.Q4 and 
ending annually 1993.Q4 through 2004.Ql successively. 
Figure 3. Test for parameter stability for model (2) starting annually 
1987.Q4 through 1997.Q l successively and ending 2004.Ql . 
Figure 4. Test for parameter stability for model (5) starting l 987.Q4 and 
ending annually l 993.Q4 through 2004.Ql successively. 
Figure 5. Test for parameter stabi lity for model (5) starting annua lly 
l 987.Q4 through 1997.Ql successively and ending 2004.Ql. 
Figure 6. Test for parameter stability for model (6) starting 1987 .Q4 and 
ending annually 1993.Q4 through 2004.Ql successively. 
Figure 7. Test for parameter stabillty for model (6) starting annually 
l 987.Q4 through 1997.Ql successively and ending 2004.Q l . 
Figure Al. The range of Taylor-type rule recommendations for different 
measures of inflation and the output gap, taken from Kozicki, 1999, page 
11, chart 3. 
Figure A2. The Taylor rule and its components, taken from Judd and 
Rudebusch, 1998, page 5, figure 1. 
Figure A3. Political regimes and the real interest rates, 1961 -1992, taken 
from Capora le and Grier, 2000, page 330, figure 2. 
26 
27 
27 
28 
28 
29 
29 
30 
31 
31 
v 
UST OFT ABLES 
Table 1. Reserve requirements, taken from The Federal Reserve Board: 4 
Reserve requirements, 2004. 
Table 2. Dickey-Fuller test for unit root on variables. 14 
Table 3. Dickey-Fuller test for unit root on models (1) and (2). 16 
Table 4. Dickey-Fuller test for unit root on models (3), (4), (5), and (6). 19 
\') 
ABSTRACT 
Jn the U.S., monetary policy deci sions are handled by our central bank, the Federal Reserve 
y tern. By targeting a desired interest rate leve l and using three main " tools" to adjust the 
money supply in order to achieve this rate, the Federal Reserve guides our economy in order 
to maintain its long-term goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth. To help 
the public better understand the actions of the Federal Reserve, economist John B. Taylor 
devised a monetary policy rule in I 993 that is both simple and reasonably accurate. In the 
decade since his pivotal rule, numerous researchers have attempted to challenge, expand, or 
redefine this equation to make it more accurate and useful. My paper reexamines two rules, 
Taylor's original rule as well as another expanded rule, by using a larger set of observations. 
I also present and test additional models that build on these two to determine if there are 
other imponant factors the Fed takes into account when deciding on the appropriate targeted 
federal funds rate. In the tvvo models that I present, it appears that when inDation is above 
the target level, the Fed responds Lo changes in infiati on and GDP much more aggressively. 
On the other hand, when in nation is at or below the objecti ve, the Fed fol lows a policy of 
interest rate smoothing. 
CHAPTER 1. JNTRODUCTJON AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL 
l11troductio11 
In most nations throughout the world there are two main functions that guide the 
economy: fiscal policy and monetary policy. Usually separate, the government deals with 
.fiscal policy through the collection and spending of tax money while a central bank handles 
the supply of money available to consumers and businesses. ln the U.S. the central bank is 
the Federal Reserve System. To help the public better understand the actions of the Federal 
Reserve, economist John B. Taylor formulated a monetary policy rule that is both simple and 
reasonably accurate. 
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will further discuss the organization and function of 
the Federal Reserve System and how it gu ides our economy by taking actions that affect the 
interest rates by changing the money supply. Taylor's monetary policy rule will be defined 
and numerous critiques wi ll be provided. Chapter 2 covers my own data analysis in which I 
describe and define the data and present various models and the statistical tests performed on 
those models. Chapter 3 concludes thi s paper with a discussion of the importance to the 
public of being able to anticipate the Federal Reserve's targeted interest rates. 
Federal Reserve System 
The Federa l Reserve System was initiated by an act of Congress, The Federal Reserve 
Act. on December 23, 1913, " to provide for the establi shment of Federal reserve banks, to 
furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a 
more effective supervision of banking in the United tatcs. and for other purposes." The 
organization·s main body consists of a seven-member Board of Governors in Washington, 
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DC, plus banks located in twelve Federal Reserve Districts located throughout the country, 
which are in Boston, New York , Phi ladelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. 
Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco (Federal Reserve Board: The 
structure of the Federal Reserve System, 2003). 
The Federal Reserve (often ref erred to as just "the Fed") is responsible for the 
country 's monetary policy decision-making. While it is commonly reported in the media that 
the Federal Reserve "sets" interest rates. thi s is not entirely accurate. They first decide on a 
target rate and then work to reach that target b y use of three too ls: open market operations, 
reserve requirements, and the discount rate policy. They are also responsible for numerous 
other operations, including regulation and supervision of member institutions, as well as laws 
regarding consumer cred it, such as the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act. 
Wi th these operations, the Fed directl y affects the level of money available to the 
economy. through the so-ca ll ed creation or destruction of money. When the nation·s 
financial markets react to these new levels of avai lab le money, a new interest rate is 
established. So. clearl y the Fed must have some knowledge that money supply and interest 
rates arc related; otherwise thi s mechanism would not be effectual. Basic macroeconomic 
fundamentals, particularly demonstrated in the LM curve, a posi tively sloped curve that 
graphs the relationship between real GDP and interest rates by equating the supply of rea l 
money balances and the money demand function. show bow interest rates respond to changes 
in the supply or demand of money, of which the supply is controlled for the most part by the 
Fed. An increase in the money supply leads to an outward shift in the LM curve, leading to a 
new equilibrium where it crosses the JS curve at a new lower interest rate and a new higher 
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GDP. John R. Hicks is credi ted \\'ith inventing the JS-LM model in 1937 in an attempt at 
summarizing John Maynard Keynes· macroeconomic principles outlined in hi s General 
Tli eoiJ· of £111ployme111, lllferest, and Money. Many college-level economic textbooks cover 
this topic and the website TheFreeDictionary.com (2004) offers a brief description. 
Monnet and Weber (200 1) present two seemingly opposing views when it comes to 
the direction of the relationship between rates and money supp ly. the liquidity effect view 
and the Fisher equation view (named after Jrving Fisher, 1896). The liquidity effect view 
posits that a decrease in the money supply wi ll lead to an increase in rates. This is the same 
as in the IS-LM model. On the other hand, the Fisher equation view states that an increase in 
the money supply will lead to an increase in rates. Monnet and Weber's research reconcile 
these differences by bringing in the notion of surpri se, commonly referred to as shocks, and 
the expectation of the likelihood of future events. If financial markets believe that a surprise 
increase in the money supply is only temporary and will not affect their expectations o f the 
future growth rate of money, then the interest rate will fall , or move in the opposite direction 
as the change in the money supply (liquidity effect view). Otherwise, if the change is 
expected to be permanent then the rate wi 11 ri se. or move in the same di rection (Fisher 
equation view). So besides merely ana lyzing relevant economic data. the Fed must take into 
account such shocks in order to guide interest rat es toward the desired targets. 
Jn di recting monetary policy, their principle tool is open market operations. The 12-
member Federal Open Market Committee (FOM C) buys and se lls US Treasury notes and 
federal agency securities. When buying notes, money is put back into public circulation, 
thereby expand ing the money supply, the so-ca ll ed creation of money. When notes are so ld. 
money moves out of circulation when the public pays for the notes. This destruction of 
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money decreases the money supply. By changing the money supply, they are able to achieve 
their short-tenn goals of maintaining a desired federal funds rate. This is the overnight 
interest rate at which depository institutions lend thei r money to other institutions through the 
Federal Reserve System. The current rate, as of November l 0, 2004, is 2.00%. See Figure 1 
for the Fed's announced federal fund rates from 1990 to present. 
The second tool is the reserve requirement, while powerful is actually rarely adjusted. 
The requirement specifies how much money a depository institution needs to " hold", either 
as cash in its vault or as deposits w ith a Federal Reserve Bank. This limits the amount of 
money it can grant in loans. A high reserve ratio effectively takes money out of circulation, 
whereas lowering the ratio will increase the supply of money avai lab le to the economy, 
which the banking institution is able to di stribute in the form of loans. Current rates are in 
the table below. 
Table 1. Reserve requirements, taken from The Federal Reserve Board: 
Reserve requirements, 2004. 
Tvpe of liability % of li ab ilities Effective date 
Net trnnsaction accounts 
$0 to S6.6 million 
More than $6.6 m to $45.4 million 
More than $45.4 million 
Non-personal time deposits 
Eurocurrency liabilities 
0 
3 
10 
0 
0 
12-25-03 
12-25-03 
12-25-03 
12-27-90 
12-27-90 
The third tool is the discount rate, whose movements oflen follow closely to the 
federal funds rate. The Fed·s definition is included here. 
The discount rate is the interest rate charged to commercial banks and other 
depository institutions on loans they receive from their regional Federal 
Reserve Bank's lending faci lity--the di scount wi ndow. Loans are extended 
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for a very short tem1 (usually overnight) to depository institutions in 
generally sound financial condition (The Federal Reserve Board: The 
Discount Rate, 2004). 
While the Federal Reserve functions to serve the public by working with other 
government agencies, members of Congress, banking industry groups, central bankers from 
foreign countries, and even members of academia, all of its operations and the decision-
making processes behind the monetary policies are not necessarily transparent. Indeed 
Romer and Romer focused on this issue in thei r 2000 study. They looked at asymmetric 
information between the Fed and commercial forecasters. They believe that the Fed has an 
advantage due to its vast resources devoted to forecasting compared to a typical private finn, 
as well as the fact that the Fed does not release its complete and final forecasts to the public 
until some Jive years after the relevant time period. This greatly hinders commercial finns' 
ability to analyze the infom1ation in the same timely manner as does the Fed. Financial 
markets must make guesses as to the Fed's actions and the motivations behind its policies. 
This leads to greater volatility and uncertainty. Romer and Romer suggest that the Fed 
should release its Green Book forecasts immcdi::itely after they have been made. They do 
caution that this may inadvertently cause the Fed to change the way it makes forecasts, which 
could be quite detrimental. Even without the Green Dook forecasts there still would be a 
definit e benefit to society, particularl y businesses, local government agencies, and university 
researchers. if there was a way to anticipate some of the Federal Reserve 's actions. ee 
Appendix for detai ls regarding the release of statements by the FOMC and a recent press 
release. The press release does not include quantitative information, which would be more 
helpfu l. This is where the Taylor ru le serves a very useful purpose. 
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The original Taylor rule 
John 8. Taylor, a Stanford University Economist currently serving as the U nder 
Secretary for Jntemational Affairs at the U.S. Dcpanment o f T reasury, is c redited with 
developing a simple and useful monetary policy rule detailing how the Federal Reserve sets 
the real short-te1m interest rat es that now bears his name. His research and re finement of this 
rule developed through the 1990s has become a benchmark idea on which other economists 
have continued to critique, expand, and change. The Federal Reserve acts to achieve targeted 
interest rates to help ensure its immediate goals of stabilizing the economy and its long-term 
goals of keeping inflation in check. Having a plausible insight into how thi s rate is set can be 
a valuab le tool to understanding the US economy. Decision makers will be better able to 
take appropriate long-tenn actions, leading to financ ial success rather than loss. 
According to the rul e, there are three factors that Taylor has identified as having an 
impact on the determination of the rea l short-term interest rate. The first factor is the interest 
rate level most consistent with full employment. The second factor is inflation, both the rate 
of price inflati on over the previous four quarters as we ll as the difference between the actual 
in nation rate and the target rate the Fed is tryi ng to achieve, also ca lled the inflation gap. 
The final facto r is the difference ben een actual economic ac ti vity and the " full employment .. 
level of activity, also referred to as the output gap. Equal weights are assigned to the 
innation gap and the output gap. This led Taylor to set up the fo llowing equati on: 
r = p + O.Sy + 0.S(p-2) + 2 
Where 
r = federa l funds rate 
p = rate of inflation over previous fo ur quarters 
y = percent deviation of real GDP from a target. 
That is. 
y = 100( Y-Y*)IY* 
Y = real GDP 
Y* = trend real GDP 
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The first 2 (in p-2 tenn) is the objective fo r inflation. The last 2 is the 
"equilibrium'· real rate which is close to the assumed steady-state growth rate 
of 2.2 percent (Taylor, 1993). 
Taylor·s rule can be simplified to the fol lowing, in which case. inflation as a 
whole received three times the weight as docs the output gap. 
r = I + 1.Sp + O.Sy 
Of course, Taylor concedes that this one simple rule cannot and should not be used by 
the policy makers at the Federal Reserve when setting rates and even provides two examples 
where the Fed deviated from the rule, during the oil-price shock of 1990 and during the bond 
market, inflation and Gennan reuni fi cation si tuation. So much more can be added to the 
equation to account for shocks or other changes in the economy, but then that wou ld defeat 
its purpose of being a straight forward, easi ly calculated rule. However, a stable rule is 
important for the pub! ic to understand the Fed· s intentions. Jn the absence of any rules. the 
Fed basically follows a discretionary policy. When this occurs. the public decision-makers 
are unable to anticipate the Fed's actions. imilar to having no rule would be having a seri es 
of mies that change frequentl y. This leads to a lack of confidence in the rule and is 
specifically apparent during the transi tion periods between rules. If the Fed puts into place a 
new policy rule while the public is not yet informed of or confident about this ne\ rule, the 
public will conti nue to anticipate a future consisten t with the old rule. Their short-term 
behaviors\ ill continue to fo llow that old rule and wi ll likely counteract the new actions the 
Fed is trying to unde11ake. Jn addit ion, long- tem1 deci sions made under the old rule, such as 
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investment projects and contracts. cannot be immediately changed when the new rule takes 
affect which also could undermine the Fed's new intentions (Taylor. 1993). 
Taylor states that his "rule fits the actual policy performance during the last few years 
remarkable well" ( l 993). I lowever, he only looks at data from 1987 to 1992, or a maximum 
of 24 quarterly observations. Not only is it a short time frame, but also the period occurs 
under only one pol itical regime (Reagan-Bush) and almost entirely under the chairmanship of 
Greenspan, bo th of which could have an impact on how these two rates are related. I wiIJ 
discuss the regime implications in the nex t section. 
Critiques of the TaJ for mle 
Although the original Taylor rule has done well in explaining the Fed' s actions, it is 
not completely accurate. One reason fo r inaccuracies involves the definitions and 
measurements of some of the factors used in the rule. for instance, inflation can be 
measured by various means: GDP deOator, CPJ, core CPl, wage infiations, and other 
methods. In addition, both the ''full employment" rate (panicularly the so-ca lled natural 
unemployment rate) and the GDP trend are estimates, so care must be taken in how these 
figures are estimated othel"\-' ise an inaccurate short-term interest rate may resu lt. For 
instance, although somewhat controversial, the general consensus regarding the natural rate 
of unemployment ranges from 5% to 6%, often depending on how libera l or conservati ve the 
policy makers are. Economic shocks also have to be taken into consideration when setting 
rates, such as the downturn in cenain sectors fo llowing the events of September l I 1h , 200 J, 
particularly the ai rline and tra,·el industries, and the recent increase in energy prices. Due to 
the exogenous nature of shocks, they are not necessaril y quan tifi ab le nor do they fi gure into 
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the original Taylor rule. The notion of us ing identical 0.5 weights on both the inflation gap 
and the output gap terms has also been questioned. The use of equal weights for both terms 
implies that the Fed considers each of these factors lo be equally important rather than having 
one dominate the other. Kozicki (1999) de lves into all of these issues. For a rule to be 
useful, it should remain robust even under different measurements, as well as being reliable. 
She argues that the Taylor-type rules don' t necessarily hold and provides several graphs that 
track the federal funds rate from 1983 to 1997 to prove thi s. In particular, see Figure Al in 
the Appendix. This graph also shows the range suggested when using each of the six 
measures of the GDP outpu t gap and the four measures of inflation (res ulting in 24 
combinations). The Taylor-type rules don't perform as well during the 1983-1985 and the 
1992-1994 periods and they also have excessively large ranges during 1983 and 1987. 
Kozicki concludes that, "po licy rules may aid in focusing policy discussions. But, lack of 
robustness with respect to the measurement of inflation and the output gap, estimates of the 
equilibrium real rate, and settings for weights limit the usefulness of rules to recommend 
funds rate settings in real ti me:· 
A s with any idea, there are alw ays new ways to think about a situation, expanding 
and hopefully enhancing the original theory. The noti on of monetary policy inertia has lead 
to new equati ons that incorporate a lag factor. Setting the new rate by taking a weighted 
average of the target rate the Fed hopes to achieve and what the rate was in the last period 
(typica lly assumed to be approximately .2 and .8 respecti vely) allows for the rate to move 
smoothly, bringing abo ut less vo latility and uncerta inty. At least thi s was the standard view 
until questioned by Rudebusch (2002). Jn hi s work, he tries to prove that if it is the case that 
a lagged interest rate value should be included, there should be greater forecast accuracy. 
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For research using the 3-month Eurodollar rate, this holds up reasonably well for the first 
qua11er. But going further out into the future, the 3-6 month and 6-9 month rates lose this 
predictability. Rudebusch believes that the apparent lag in Taylor's rule is actuall y due to 
special circumstances and persistent shocks, such as the commodity scares in 1988-1989 and 
1994-1995 (higher rates), the so called "cred it crunch" of 1992-1993 (lower rates), and a 
worldwide financial crisis in 1998 and 1999 (lower). 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) warn us that the Fed and the public may be in a 
dangerous cycle when it comes to having rules that explain the interest rates. Having a rule 
is a good way of keeping long-tern1 goals in mind and not forsaking them when trying to 
achieve short-term objectives. The process becomes transparent, allowing the public to react. 
But there is a danger of self-fulfilling expectations in thi s case, especially when using only 
expected inflation as a basis for determining the inflation gap. They argue that when the Fed 
uses expected inflation to set policy, the public interprets that policy and then anticipates a 
certain level of future inflation. If people believe prices wi11 be higher tomorrow, they will 
act a certain way today that they normally wou ld not have, resulting in exactly the higher 
prices they feared. This self-fulfilling expectation is exacerbated by the fact that 
coordination among the members of the public is unlikely. This is known as .. sunspot" 
behav ior. A sunspot is extraneous information that affects behavior, an observable signal 
that influences actions. One such example is the run on banks during the Great Depression. 
Jf someone believes that others will run to the bank to remove thei r money that person will 
be more likely to run to the bank to remove hi s own money, thus compounding the bank run 
panic he had feared. As a way to prevent this, Carlstrom and Fuerst recommend also us ing 
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past in nation trends in the calculations. not so lely depending on future forecasts. This way. 
the funds rate will respond to past price movements. 
Questions have been raised about how the differing pol itical and Fed chairmanship 
regimes have had an affect on interest rates, something that typica lly cannot be captured in a 
simple rule. Judd and Rudebusch ( 1998) looked at how the Taylor rule performed against the 
actual federal funds rate from 1970 Lo 1998 during the chairmanships of Arthur Bums 
(1970.Q l-1978.QI), Pau l Volcker (1979.Q3-1 987.Q2), and Alan Greenspan (1987.Q3-
present). The period from 1978.Q2 to l979.Q2 under G. William Miller was not included in 
the analysis due to the extremely short time frame. In a revealing graph, Figure A2 in the 
Appendix, the Taylor rule approximation was consistently above the actual rate during 
Bums· reign. The two crossed over in the early 1980s but stil l maintained a significant gap. 
reaching nearly 5 percentage points in 1983. During this time the actual federa l funds rate 
was higher, meaning that the Fed was being much more aggressive in combating inflation 
than the Taylor rule would have recommended. But by the Greenspan era the gap is quite a 
bit narrower, mean ing the Taylor ru le was doing a much better job in anticipating the actual 
rate. Caporale and Grier (2000) also focus on the political regimes in power in addition to 
the chairmen, analyzing data from 1961 to1992. While the president and Congress are 
responsible fo r fi scal dec is ion-making and not monetary policy, the nvo functions are closely 
related and therefore it cannot be ignored when focusing on the changes in the interest rate. 
The political regimes were broken down to include the presidencies of Kennedy-Johnson, 
Nixon-Ford, arter, and Reagan-Bush, as we ll as the Republican Senate era from 1981 to 
1986. Using alternat ive mean-shi fling models of the real interest rates, they concluded that: 
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[C]hanges 111 the political party controlling the presidency or Congress 
match up very c losely to the shift dates estimated in the data using 
stati stical methods, explain a large amount of the varia ti on in the real rate, 
and are robust to the inclusion of a variety of macro variables. Conversely 
we find little to no evidence that changes in the Federal Reserve 
chairmanship are robustly related in real rate shifts (Caporale and Grier, 
2000). 
Their graph, Figure A3 in the Appendix, demonstrates the shifts. 
Taking these last two articles together, we can note that the Burns ' chai rmanship 
somewhat overlaps with the Nixon-Ford period, Volcker 's with the Reagan-Bush and 
Repub lican Senate eras, and Greenspan ·s time was subsequent to that, which may be why the 
political regime change dominates the chaim1anship regimes. The closer consistency 
between the federal funds rate and the Taylor rule ' s recommendations under Greenspan may 
be better explained by the political climate. George .HW Bush's presidency from 1989 to 
1993 shows a tigh ter correlation than during Bill C limon·s time in the White House from 
1993 to the end of the study in 1998 when the actual rate dipped below then shot back up 
above the estimated rate. 
These five artic les arc j ust a smal I representation of the critiques and criticisms of the 
original Taylor rule. Many people have not only given their opinions but have tri ed to 
expand or improve upon this si mple ru le, hoping to a lso leave their mark in the world of 
monetary policy. What follows is my contribution to this field. 
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CHAPTER 2. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data collectio11 and definitions 
Data was colJ ected from the federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' website and covers 
the period of J 987.Q4 through 2004.Ql , or 66 quarterly observations. Taylor's (1993) data 
covers 1987 through 1992 whi le Rudebusch 's (2002) covers 1987.Q4 through 1999.Q4. The 
year 1987 was chosen as a breakpoint because Alan Greenspan was appointed as the 
Chaimrnn of the Federal Reserve Board effective August 11, 1987. 
Taylor's notation wi lJ be used throughout my work; however I wi ll make use of some 
of Rudebusch 's definitions. Phrases in quotation marks are the names used by the Federal 
Reserve to specify the data. Taylor's r, is the "effective federal funds rate" . Inflation is 
calculated by using the "Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index" P,, where n, = 
400(ln P, - In P,.1 ). So Taylor' s p , the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters, is 
equal to Y.t L.n,-J where} = 0, 1,2.3. The output gap, y, is defined by Taylor as the percent 
deviation of rea l GDP, Y, from trend real GDP, Y*, whereas Rudebusch words it as the 
percent difference between actual GDP, "Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal", and 
potential output, '·Real Potenti al Gross Domestic Product" . Both use the same formula but 
with slightly different letter notion,y == lOO( Y-Y*)IY*. 
Model development and testing 
Before deciding on possible models, it is import ant to understand the nature of the 
variables and how they behave. As is frequently the case with time-seri es data, the value of 
one observation can depend on its value one or more pe1iods back. The purpose of testing if 
a variable contains a unit root is to see if it is stable and returns to a certain mean. or is 
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nonstationary and continues Lo move in a certain direction without returning Lo a stable mean. 
To test, we start with the equation x, = px,.1 + c1 and subtract :x,. 1 from both sides. This gives 
us !:u:, = yx,.1 + Ei, where y = p - I. o. testing a nu ll hypothesis of p = 1 in the first case is 
the same as testing if y = 0 in the second. We proceed by using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method of regression. estimating the value of y and its standard error. The t-statistic 
generated is then compared Lo the critical values calculated by Dickey and Fuller which 
allows us to either reject or fai l to reject the null hypothesis. lf we fail to reject Ho: y = 0, 
then the series contains a unit root. Besides&, = yx,.1 +Ct, which is a pure random walk 
model , Dickey and Fuller have two more models:&,= ao + yx,.1 +Ci, which includes an 
intercept or drift term, and l:!.x, = a0 + yx,.1 + a2t + £i. which includes both a drift and a linear 
time trend. Therefore, three separate tables of cri tical values are provided by Dickey and 
Fuller. The results returned by Stata when performing the Dickey-Fuller test for unit root 
provides a test stati stic. Z(t), as we ll asap-value for Z(t). The interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
critical values at the I%, 5%, and I 0% con fid ence levels are also reported. The higher the p-
value, the more ce11ain you can be that you should fail to reject the null hypothesis, i.e. the 
series is nonstationary. Jn performing the Dickey-Fuller unit root test on the variables, I fail 
to reject the null hypothesis for each variable and thus assume the existence of unit roots. 
Therefore the variables arc not stab le and do not return to a given mean. 
Table 2 Dickcv-Fuller test for unit root on variables 
Variab le Z(t) p-value Unit root 
Federal funds rate: r -0.372 0.9158 Yes 
In Oat ion: p -0.926 0.7803 Yes 
Output gap: y - 1.257 0.6482 Yes 
Lag.E.?ed Federal funds rate: r,.1 -0.082 0.95 J 4 Yes 
Cri tical va lues: I% -3 .559; 5% -2.918; 10% -2.594 
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In li eht of the conclusion that the variab les arc nonstati onary. we proceed to the next 
step of determining if co integrati on is present. Cointegration refers to a linear combination 
of nonstat ionary vari ables. If the individual variables arc not stable, it may still be possible 
to combine them in such a way that the difference between the variables is stable, or always 
staying close to or returning to a given mean, in w hich case the variables are considered to be 
cointegrated. This test only needs to be performed when the variab les are nonstationary. lf 
they were stable, then when they were combined, the combination wou ld necessarily be 
stable as well , thus eliminating the need to test for cointegration . 
To test for cointegration requires running a regression on a model and then predicting 
the residuals. The residua ls arc then tested for the presence of a unit root by using the 
Dickey-Full er method as described above. l started with two models. Model (1) uses lhc 
vari ables from Taylor' s o ri ginal ru le and model (2) comes from Rudebusch 's (2002) work. 
which includes a lagged federa l funds rate on the right hand side of the equation. Standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses. The constant tenn was onl y fo und to be signifi cant in 
model ( 1) and there fore was removed from model (2) . 
r = 0.838 + J .975p + 0.859y + c 
(0.375) (0.154) (0 .077) 
r = 0.4 14p + 0.257y + 0.8 16r,_, + E 
(0.107) (0.048) (0.046) 
n = 66, R2 = 0.8027 
n = 66 
( I ) 
(2) 
Before proceeding wi th a Dickey-Fu ll er un it root test on the residua ls, I must first 
check to determine the appropriate number of lags to include. I proceeded with the following 
equation using the residuals from the regressions of mode ls (l) and (2) : 
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Running a regression on the above equat ion. I tested to . ce if the last term. o,,L~e1.5, is 
signi ficantl y different from zero. If not, I re-ran the regression after eliminating that variable. 
Successive regressions arc nm until a significant coeffi cient is reached. thereby determining 
the appropriate number of lags. Tf none are significantly different from zero, no lags are 
requi red. Repeating thjg sequence on both models, I concluded that none of the Oi parameters 
on the differenced residuals were significantl y different from zero. Therefore, I ran the 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests without including any Jags, using the critical values provided by 
Hamilton in Table B.9 in his Appendix B (l 994). For this test, it is discovered that the 
residuals for model (1) contain a unit root since again l fail to reject the null hypothesis. This 
means that there is no cointcgration and the residuals arc nonstationary. Thus, the model is 
invalid because there is no stable relationship between the variables over time. However, for 
model (2) that includes the lagged federal funds rate. l rejected the null hypothesis and 
concluded that there is coi ntegration, that there exists a linear combination of the variables 
which is stable. Therefore J wi ll proceed with testing on model (2) only. Even though 
Rudebusch (2002) criticized the use of a lagged federal funds rate due to its inability to 
accurately forecast the target rate more than a few months into the future, I believe that not 
including it leads to an inva lid model. 
Ti bl 3 ff k F II fi a e 1c ey- u er test or umt root on mo d I ( ) e s 1 ) and (2 . 
Model Z(t) Coin te2rated 
(1) r = 0.838 + 1.975p + 0.859y -1.959 0 
(2) r = 0.4 I 4p + 0.257}1 + 0.8 l 6r1• 1 -4.579 Yes 
Cri ti cal values for 2 right-hand variables (case 2 with constant), model (1): 
1% -4.3 1; 5% -3 .77; 10%-3.45. 
Critical values for 3 right-hand variables (case I without constant), model (2): 
1 % -4.30; 5% -3.74; 10% -3.44 
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ln general. the Taylor-type models have been known to be unstable. This can be 
observed by looking again at Figure A2 in the Appendix, which shows the rate predicted by 
the Taylor rul e versus the actual federal funds rate. There is greater discrepancy between the 
two from 1970 to 1987 than from 1988 to 1998. To try to el iminate this, I have limited m y 
data to cover the period starting when Alan Greenspan became the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, beginning in the fourth quarter of 1987. Referring back to Judd and 
Rudebusch 's 1998 work di scussed earlier, the Tay lor rule was doing a much better job in 
anticipating the actual rate dur ing the Greenspan regime than under either of the two previous 
chairmen. To examine the validity of model (2), my nex t step was to look at the stabil ity of 
the coefficients over time. The rationa le for this is to determine U1e model's reliability. 1f 
there is little variation in a variable ' s coeffi cient over time, this means the predicted federal 
funds rate shou ld move proportionally to the movement of that variable. On the other hand, 
if the coefficient is not stable, we can assume that the Fed is not consistently fo llowing only 
one simple ru le. This instability could be caused when the Fed reli es more so on one vari able 
than ru10ther, i .e. places di fferent weighting factors on inflation and output during each 
dec is ion-making process, or when the Fed takes into account other vari ables previously not 
considered, such as the unemployment rate or housing starts. 
To test for stability, l ran and graphed two d.iffe rent expanding seri es of regress ions, 
see Figures 2 and 3. The fi rst one a lways started with l 987.Q4 and ended with 1993.Q4 
yearl y through 2003.Q4 successively, as well as a regression that covered the entire period of 
1987.Q4 to 2004.Ql . The other seri es was generall y the same, only in reverse. This time I 
sta11ed with 1988.Ql yea rl y thro ugh I 997.Q4 success ive ly and always ended wi th 2004.Q l , 
as well as the overall period. Only the inflation coeffi cient in F igure 2, shows a moderate 
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amoun t of instability varying by approximately 0.6. The output gap and the lagged interest 
rates coeffi cients are much more stable, varying by onl y 0.18 and 0.26 respectively. Figure 3 
shows much more stabi lity in all three coefficients: a 0.3 variation for inflation and 0. 12 
variations for both the output gap and the lagged interest rate. 
The next step was to fo1m some new models to see if it was possible to improve the 
stability of the coefficients, particularly the one for inflation. A general consensus has been 
formed that the Fed's objective for inflation is around 2%. One thought is that it is possible 
that the Fed would follow one course of action when the real inflation rate was near, at, or 
below the objecti ve and a different course of action when the rate was higher than the 
objective. Explicitly modeling this behavior could take care of the problem regarding some 
of the instability in the coefficients of the variables. By including two scenarios in the 
model, thi s would account for the fac t that the coefficien ts on the vari ables can take on 
different values. From this idea, four new models were fom1ed: 
r = ao+ a,p + a])'+ Pod2 + p,d2(p) + P2d2(y) (3) 
r = ao + a,p + U])I + Pod2.5 + p,d2.5(p) + r32d2.5(y) ( 4) 
r = ao + a,p + U])I + a3r,_, + Pod2 + p,d2(p) + P2d2(y) + p3d2(r,_1) (5) 
r = ao+a,p + U])I + a3r,_, + Pod2.5 + P1d2.5(p) + P2d2.5(y) + p3d2.5(r,_1) (6) 
Initially J included the dummy variables on the constants, i.e. Pod2 and Pod2.5, but 
discovered that the dummy-times-constant variab le and the dumm y-times-inflation variable 
had a simple correlation coefficient of 0.97, meaning 1 have a problem with multi-
collinearity. Simply removing one of the vari ables can eliminate this problem. J also found 
that the constant itself was not significant. After removing both the constant and the dummy-
times-constant variables, J was left with the fol lowing four revised models. 
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r = a.1p + ai..v + P1d2(p) + P2d2(r) 
r = a 1p + U?J' + P1d2.5(p) + P2d2.5(r) 
r = a1p + a2y + a3r1.1 + P1d2(p) + P2d2(v) + p3d2Cr1-1) 
r = a1p + ai.,v + Ofr-1 + P1d2.5(p) + P2d2.5(}') + p3d2.5(r,.1) 
Where 
c/2 is a dum my variab le = 1 when p ~ 2%; = 0 otherwise 
c/2.5 is a d ummy vari ab le= 1 when p ~ 2.5%; = 0 otherwise 
A ll o ther variables are as in Taylor 's origina l rule. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Again, I regressed and then predicted the residuals for the above four models. Using 
the differenced residual equation to determ ine the num ber of lags to include, I fo und that two 
lags were required for m odel (3) but zero lags were required for the remaining three models, 
(4), (5), and (6). Perform ing the Dickey-Full er unit root test on the residuals fo r models (3) 
wi th two Jags and ( 4) with zero lags, both wi thout the lagged federa l funds rate, I faj J to reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude the existence of unjt roots but no coin tegrati on. T his is the 
same conclusion J reached with model ( 1 ). However, for models (5) and (6), I reject the nu ll 
hypothesis at the 5% probability level, detem1ining that there is no unit root and therefore 
conc lude that cointcgration does ex ist, just as l d id with model (2) . So I again fou nd tha t the 
mode ls without the lagged va lue are invalid and con tinued with on ly models (5) and (6) . 
Table 4. Dickey-Ful ler test for uni t root on models (3), (4), (5), and (6) . 
Model Z(t) Cointe2ra ted 
(3) r = a1p + O.?J' + P1d2(p) + P2d2(l') -2.577 No 
(4) r = a1p + O.zY + P1 d2.5(p) + P2d2.5(y) -2.2 15 No 
(5) r = a1p + U4}' + a.y·,.1 -5.092 Yes 
+ P1d2(p) + P2d2(v) + P2d2(r,_,) 
(6) r = 0.1p + 0.2J' + 0.3r ,.1 -4.705 Yes 
+ Bid2.5(p) + P2d2.5(v) + p3d2.5(r ,.1) 
Critica l values fo r 4 right-hand vari ables (case 1 ), mode ls (3) and (4): 
1% -4.67; 5% -4.13; 10% -3 .8 1. 
Critical values for 6 ri ght-ha nd variables (case I), model (5) and (6): 
I% -5.27; 5% -4.62; I 0% -4.38. 
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When inflation is greater than 2% or 2.5%, d2 and d2.5 are zero. Regressing models 
(5) and (6) results in the following: 
r = 0.735p + 0.353y + 0.668r,_, 
r = l .057p + 0.395y + 0.528r,_1 
(5a) 
(6a) 
When inflation is less than or equal to 2% or 2.5%, d2 and d2.5 are one. In this case the 
coefficients on the variables become a i + ~i = 'Yi: 
r = (0. 735 - 0.536)p + (0.353 - 0.227)y + (0.668+ 0.246)r,_, 
r = (1.057 - 0.782)p + (0.395 - 0.2)y + (0.528 + 0.346)r,_, 
Or: 
r = O. l 99p + 0.126y + 0.914r1-1 
r = 0.275p + 0.195y + 0.874r,_1 
(5b) 
(6b) 
(5b) 
(6b) 
Comparing (5a) and (5b ), when the inflation level is above the target of 2%, more 
emphasis is placed on the combined inflation and output gap, 0.332 vs. 0.086, than when 
inflation is less than or equal to 2%. In particular , much of the focus is on inflation, which 
carries a higher coefficjent, 0.735, than what even the lagged federal funds rate does, 0.668. 
This means that there is much more smoothing occurring when inflation is below the target 
level desired by the Fed. Selecting 2.5% as the cutoff point results in even more emphasis 
being placed on both the inflation and output gap combined, 0.472, and inflation alone, 
1.057, when inflation is higher than 2.5%, (6a) . When inflation is less than or equal to 2.5%, 
the Jagged federal funds rate takes on more importance, 0.874 (6b) . 
Examining the stability of the coeffi cients was achieved by again running and 
graphing tv,10 expanding seri es of regressions on models (5) and (6) in the same method as 
described prev ious ly for model (2). Although stability of the coeffi cients on a few of the 
variables was quite good, overalJ , the performance of each of the models showed less 
stability than the original model before the dummy va riables were added. The coefficient on 
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the dummy-times-output gap variable in model (5) vari ed by nearl y 1.7 points, see Figure 4, 
and the coeffici ent on the in nati on variable moved as much as 1.4 points, see Figure 5. The 
coefficient on the dummy-times-inflati on variable in model (6) varied by over 0.7 points, see 
Figure 6, and the coefficient on the infla tion vari able moved by over 2.3 points, see Figure 7. 
All of these movements were greater than the 0.6 point variation on inflation observed in 
mode l (2). 
Model selectio11 
After performing all robustness tests on the six model s, model (2) seems to be the 
best choice, using Taylor ' s ori ginal variables but a lso including the lagged federal funds rate 
as Rudebusch (2002) did, resulting in the following equation: 
r = 0.41 4p + 0.257y + 0.8 16r ,_, 
Rudebusch ' s regression yielded the following: 
r = 0.27(1.53p + 0.93y ) + 0.73r,_, 
Converting it to match my notation gives us: 
r = 0.41 3p + 0.25 ly + 0. 73 r,_1. 
The coeffi cients on both inflation and the ou tput gap for my equation are almost 
identi cal to Rudebusch ' s. However, w hen adding 13 quarterly observations, my equation 
shows a stronger link between the lagged federal funds rate and the n ew targeted rate, 0.816 
vs. 0.73, or greater pers istence. This equati on shows that w hen the Fed is making its decision 
on what the targeted federa l funds rate should be, it looks at the rate of inflation over the 
previous fo ur quarters as well as the percent deviation of real GDP from a target, or the 
output gap, but only assigns an importance of around 20% to that va lue. A full 80% of the 
new target is based on its last targeted rate. This is known as interest rate smoothi ng, or 
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inertia. which essentiall y el iminates some of the possible volatility in the movement of the 
rate. While many consider this valid , as discussed earlier in the critiques of the Taylor rule 
section Rudebusch argued against it. stating that if it was indeed true then the equation 
should be a very reliable forecasting tool. On the contrary, his work revealed that when 
looking out into the future beyond one quarter, this equation does not remain robust. 
The Fed itself may actually refute Rudebusch ' s findings. In reviewing the Federal 
Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress in July, 2004, Alan 
Greenspan states that, "monetary pol icy neutrality can be restored at a measured pace, [so 
that a] relatively smooth adjustment of businesses and households to a more typical level of 
interest rates seems likely." Italics are mine. This smoothing is important because, 
"considerably more uncertain ty and hence ri sk surrounds the behavior of the economy with a 
more rapid ti ghtening of monetary policy than is the case when tightening is more 
measured." Tightening refers to decreasing the money supply, which leads to an increase in 
interest rates. This shows that the Fed ack nowledges that it wants to avoid abrupt changes in 
the federal funds rate, which can be achieved by placing some weight on the rate's past 
value. 
Rudebusch·s theory that specia l circumstances and persistent shocks affect the Fed·s 
deci sions is actual ly supported in the same report. Greenspan mentions "corporate 
accounting and governance scandals", '"geopolitical tensions", and "potenti al terrorism" as 
some of the uncertainties in the economy. which are dinicu lt to quant ify. This lends support 
to the idea that although a simple mathematica l rule may be useful, the Fed still must take 
into account countless other pieces of infon11ation when making monetary policy decisions. 
This is best summed up in the closing paragraph of Greenspan's testimony: 
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As we attempt to assess and manage these risks, we need, as always, to be 
prepared for the unexpected and to respond promptly and fl exibly as 
situations warrant. But although our actions need to be fl ex ible, our 
objectives are not. For twenty-five years, the Federal Reserve has worked 
to reestabllsh price stability on a sustained basis. An environment of price 
stabi lity allows households and businesses to make decisions that best 
promote the longer-term growth of our economy and with it our nation's 
continuing prosperity (The Federal Reserve Board: Testimony of Chairman 
Alan Greenspan, 2004). 
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CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSION 
The introduction in 1993 o f the Taylor rul e equati on was a pivotal moment in hi story. 
Although it proba bly doesn·t rival the publicati on of A lbert E instein's special theory of 
relativity equation of E = mc2 in 1905, it 's still considered very significant, especially among 
monetary policy focused macroeconomists and other decision makers. In the decade 
following the ri se of thi s simple monetary policy rule, many others have sought to challenge, 
expand, or redefine thi s equation to make it more accurate and useful. However, Hetzel 
(2000, page 3) might have summed it up best when he stated, "Even if one assumes that a 
functional form like the Taylor rule successfull y predicts the behavior of the funds rate, what 
has one learned about the behav ior of the FOMC? Unfortunately, the answer is ' nothing' ... " . 
Simply put, there typicall y ari ses some exogenous shock or "sunspot" which changes the 
behaviors of the public or the interest rate setting poli cies of the Federal Open M arket 
Committee that cannot possibly be captured in a simple, or even a complex, equation . ln 
other words, the Fed still exercises some level of discretionary po licy making decisions. 
While many of the arti cles I surveyed in my paper suggest that it is not optimal fo r 
the Fed to base their short-term decisions on the mechanical workings of a Taylor-type rule, 
few seem to m ention that there is a world outside the Federal Reserve that can benefi t from 
being ab le to use a simple too l in order to anticipate future interest rate levels. U .S. 
corporations, financial markets, state and loca l governments, individuals, and even foreign 
countries would be included in thi s group. A company's long-term fin ancing strategies can 
greatl y be iniluenced by where it sees interest rates heading in the future. A company will be 
more willing to invest in major projects if it believes it can acqu ire loans at low interest rates. 
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Individual homeowners are also concerned about this infonnation when deciding when to 
take on a home mortgage loan or w hether or not to refinance an ex isting mortgage. 
While the original Taylor rul e still may be the gold standard, through my paper I have 
tried to find support for a new model wh ich takes into account several more years of 
observations than Taylor 's very limited time period. By including a lagged federal funds rate 
term, changes will be more gradua l, allowing for the public to be better able to anticipate 
future actions by the Fed . Knowing the Fed is keeping long-term goals in focus when 
targeting short-tem1 interest rates will rai se the level of confidence the public has in the 
Federal Reserve. 
Even though my two new models didn ·1 prove to have the same level of stability in 
the coefficien ts as the s imple model with on ly the lagged federal funds rate added, I was able 
to show tha t when inDation is below the Fed 's objecti ve, they are much more likely to be 
content w ith the cull'ent course of action, heavily basing a new rate on the previous period . 
However, when inOation rates rise above the objective, the Fed appears to respond more 
strong ly to changes in inOation and the output gap. particularl y the former. Adding more 
observations. especially over differen t regimes. may lend support to the idea that the Fed 
fo llows a different course of action during times of increased inOation than it does during 
periods of price stab ility. 
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APPENDIX 
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Note: The shaded area reflects the range of rule recommendations based on recommendations calculat¢ for each of the six measures of 
the output gap and each of the four measures of inflation. Jn eacb quarter, the maximum of the range COtTCSpOnds to the maximum of the 
24 rule recommendations, and the minimum of the range corresponds tO the minimum ofthe"24 rule recommendations. Taylor recom-
mendations were calculated by the author using the Taylor rule in (1) and the latest version of data for real GDP and the GDP chain price 
index available in DecembeT 1998. These recommendations were based on the Taylor output gap dcscnl>e<l in Appendix A. 
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, author's calculatioos. 
Figure Al. The range o fTaylor-lype rule recommendations for di fferent 
measures of inflation and the output gap, taken from Kozicki, 1999, page 11 , 
chart 3. 
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Description of statement release policy from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website: 
A statement is released at 2: 15 pm on the final day of each FOMC meeting. The 
disclosure policy has evolved over the years as the FOMC has sought lo provide more 
infonnation on its views on economic activi ty and risks to the outlook. 
• From 1994 through 1998, a written statement was released whenever the FOMC 
changed the stance of monetary policy. 
• In 1995, tbe statement began to include the objective for the federal funds rate. In 
late 1998, the FOMC began releasing a statement immediately after certain meetings 
when the stance of monetary policy remained unchanged but the Committee 
nonetheless wanted to communicate to the public a major shift in its views about the 
balance ofrisks or the likely direction of fulTire policy. 
• Since February 2000, the FOMC has issued a statement afier each meeting. That 
statement has usually included language that describes the Committee's judgment 
about the risks to the attainment of its long-run goals of price stability and sustainable 
economic growth. 
• Since March 2002, the statement has included each member s vote on monetary 
policy decisions (About the Fed: FedFAQ, 2004). 
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Recent press release from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website. 
Release Date: ovembcr 10, 2004 
For immediate release 
The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to raise its target for the federa l fw1ds 
rate by 25 basis points to 2 percent. 
The Comm ittee believes that, even a fl er this action, the stance of monetary policy remains 
accommodat ive and, coupled with robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing 
ongoing suppo1  to economic acti vity. Output appears lo be growing at a moderate pace 
despite the rise in energy prices, and labor market conditions have improved. Jnflation and 
longer-tem1 inflation expectations remain well contained. 
The Committee perceives the upside and downside risks to the attainment of both sustainable 
growth and price stability for the next few quarters to be roughly equal. With underlying 
inflation expected to be relatively low, the Committee believes that policy accommodation 
can be removed at a pace lhat is likely to be measured. Nonetheless, the Committee will 
respond to changes in economic prospects as needed to fulfill its obligation to maintain price 
stability. 
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Alan Greenspan, Chairman; Timothy F. 
Geithner, Vice Chairman; Ben S. Bemanke; Susan S. Bies; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. ; Edward 
M. Gramlich; Thomas M. Hoenig; Donald L. Kohn; Cathy E. Minehan; Mark W. Olson; 
Sandra Pianalto; and William Poole. 
In a related action, the Board or Governors unanimously approved a 25 basis point increase 
in the discount rate to 3 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests 
submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston New York, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atl anta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Kansas 
City. 
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